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“…BLESS HER LITTLE HEART!” 
 
THE CULTURE OF HONOR AND EMOTION RECOGNITION 
 
by 
 
FORREST RACKHAM 
 
(Under the Direction of Amy Hackney) 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
Some researchers assert that cultural display rules may explain differences in perceiving 
emotions (Matsumoto, Yoo, & Chung, 2010). The current study examined the display 
rule of masking within the Southern culture of honor. It was hypothesized that masking 
within the culture of honor negatively affects emotion perception sensitivity, particularly 
in the speed and accuracy of recognizing anger. Southern undergraduate students were 
primed with the culture of honor and then presented with the Emotional Expression 
Multimorph Task. Participants chose one of the six emotions (i.e., sad, happy, surprise, 
fear, disgust, or anger). It was hypothesized participants in the masking and 
masking/culture of honor prime groups would take significantly longer recognizing 
emotions than the mimicking/culture of honor prime and mimicking (control) groups. 
Results indicated an effect of masking on emotion perception, F(1, 77) = 4.16, p = .04, 
partial η2 = .05, supporting the hypothesis that participants who mask would take 
significantly longer than the participants who do not mask to correctly identify emotions. 
The main effect of the culture of honor prime was not significant. Participants were 
 
 
 
 
significantly slower at perceiving anger when compared to happiness and surprise. This 
study further substantiates masking as a display rule and its effects on facial feedback. It 
was not determined that the culture of honor affects emotion recognition through the 
mechanism of masking. Future research studies could use more ecologically 
generalizable variables to determine if masking occurs within the culture of honor. 
 
INDEX WORDS: emotion recognition, emotion perception, culture of honor, 
masking, display rules, Southern 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
Statement of the Problem 
Emotions are experienced in almost all situations. Emotions shape the canvas of 
life and personal experience. Among the varieties and hues of emotion, there are some 
basic emotions that are universal (Ekman, 1989; Ekman & Friesen, 1971; Matsumoto, 
1992). These emotions—happiness, anger, sadness, surprise, disgust, fear, and contempt 
(Ekman, 1992; Ekman, 1999; Ekman, 2003; Levenson, Ekman, Heider, & Friesen, 
1992)—influence other people (Blairy et al., 1999; Hess & Blairy, 2001; Lundqvist & 
Dimberg, 1995; Wicker et al., 2003; Wild, Erb, & Bartels, 2001). They help people know 
whether to approach or avoid other people (Adams, Ambady, Macrae & Kleck, 2006; 
Ekman, 2003; Marsh, Ambady, & Kleck, 2005). For example, sadness can engender 
sympathy from others (Ekman, 2003, pp. 88) and fear can engender fear and/or anger in 
others and signal danger (Adolphs, Russel, & Tranel, 1999; Ekman, 2003; Morris et al., 
1996).  
Anger also appears to signal different messages and engenders different emotions 
in people (Ekman, 2003). Anger can engender anger or fear (Adolphs, Russel, & Tranel, 
1999; Ekman, 2003; Morris et al., 1996) and can signal possible violence (Ekman, 2003). 
In fact, anger has been predictive of domestic violence (Cascardi, Vivian, & Meyer, 
1991; Dobash & Dobash, 1984), child abuse (Kolko, 1996; Peterson, Ewigman, & 
Vandiver, 1994; Rodriguez & Green, 1997), road rage and automobile accidents 
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(Deffenbacher, Huff, Lynch, Oetting, & Salvatore, 2000; Deffenbacher, Lynch, Filetti, 
Dahlen, Oetting, 2003) and murder (Nisbett & Cohen, 1996; U.S. Department of Justice, 
2009). 
With anger being predictive of possible legal and physical ramifications it is 
especially important to recognize this emotion in others (Cohen, Vandello, Puente, & 
Rantilla, 1999). The problem is that some societies or cultures encourage its members to 
display other emotions rather than their felt emotion of anger (Diefendorff & Greguras, 
2008; Diefendorff, Moreheart, & Gabriel, 2010; Kraut & Johnston, 1979; Matsumoto, 
2006; Underwood, Coie, & Herbsman, 1992; Zaalberg, Manstead, & Fischer, 2004). This 
is an example of a phenomenon known as masking, the process of controlling one’s own 
emotions to convey socially appropriate messages. The consequence of masking is that it 
may make it more difficult for others to recognize another person’s expressed emotion 
(Diefendorff & Greguras, 2008; Diefendorff, Moreheart, & Gabriel, 2010; Kraut & 
Johnston, 1979; Matsumoto, 2006; Underwood et al., 1992; Zaalberg et al., 2004). And, 
if a person has difficulty recognizing another person’s expressed emotion such as anger, 
fear, or disgust, it becomes more difficult for an individual to  disrupt displays of anger 
from escalating into violence—and possibly death.  
A culture of honor (Nisbett & Cohen, 1996) is one such culture that encourages 
the expression of politeness to protect against possible violence and retaliation (Cohen, 
Vandello, Puente, & Rantilla, 1999). Yet cultures which espouse honor report more 
occurrences of violence and homicide than other cultures (Brown, Osterman, & Barnes, 
2009; Cohen, 1998; Cohen, 2009; Cohen & Nisbett, 1994; Harinck, Beersma, Hoorne, & 
Ghauharali, 2008; IJzerman, van Dijk, & Gallucci, 2003; Nisbett & Cohen, 1996; 
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Rodriguez Mosquera, Manstead, & Fischer, 2002; Shackelford, 2005; Vandello & Cohen, 
2003; Vandello, Cohen, & Ransom, 2008). Research has found that when compared to 
people outside the culture of honor, people within the culture of honor have difficulty and 
are slower at recognizing anger and aggressive cues from other in-group members 
(Cohen et al., 1999). Masking may be the mechanism that diminishes the ability to 
correctly recognize and identify anger, fear, or disgust for those who are in the culture of 
honor.  
Purpose of the Study 
The goal of this study is to examine experimentally induced masking within the 
context of the culture of honor and its effect upon the speed and accuracy of correctly 
identifying another person’s emotion. In other words we will be exploring how masking 
and the culture of honor affects an individual’s ability to correctly identify six basic 
emotions, or a person’s perception sensitivity. 
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CHAPTER II 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
Evolutionary and Biological Basis to Emotion 
 Many researchers argue for the universality of emotions (Ekman, 1989; Ekman & 
Friesen, 1971; Matsumoto, 1992), emphasizing that evolution has helped create similar 
emotional palettes across the cultural landscapes. Other researchers, though, do not agree 
upon the universality of these emotions, calling into question theory (Ortony & Turner, 
1990), methodology (Russell, 1994), and how emotion is expressed across cultures 
(Russell, 1995). Regardless, most researchers agree upon six to seven basic emotions 
shared by all cultures: happiness, anger, sadness, surprise, disgust, fear, and contempt 
(Ekman, 1992; Ekman, 1999; Ekman, 2003; Levenson, Ekman, Heider, & Friesen, 1992). 
Despite agreement, some researchers argue that surprise cannot be classified as an 
emotion (Shaver, Schwartz, Kirson, & O’Connor, 1987). However, Ekman (2003) argues 
that surprise can be pleasurable and unpleasurable, dependent on context and individual 
preference, and displays distinct characteristics, qualities shared by other emotions. Other 
research indicates that additional emotions such as pride (Lewis, 2000; Tracy & Robins, 
2007; Tracy & Robins, 2008) and shame (Dougherty, Bartlett, & Izard, 1974; Keltner, 
1995; Lewis, 2000) should be included in the universal palette.  
 Differences and suggested inclusions aside, emotions are theorized to be 
evolutionary (Ekman, 1992; Izard, 1994; Matsumoto & Willingham, 2009) and have 
evolved to allow us to adapt to our environmental surroundings (Izard, 2007). As early as 
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Darwin (Darwin, 1872; 1998), it was theorized that the environment requires a response 
from the organism and that emotions help to fill that response (Ekman, 2003). Emotions 
have developed into complex systems comprised of behaviors and thoughts (Elliot & 
Greenber, 2007; Greenberg, 2004; Levenson et al., 1992; Rosenberg et al., 2001), and 
physiological and experiential components (Elliot & Greenberg, 2007; Greenberg, 2004; 
Gross & Levenson, 1993, 1997; Levenson et al., 1992) to serve as warning mechanisms 
in cases of danger and assist the organism in mate selection. Additionally, emotions have 
been found to be necessary for physiological regulation (Gottman & Declaire, 1997) and 
interpersonal communication (Ekman, 1992; Elliot & Greenberg, 2007; Greenberg, 
2004). Nowhere are emotions more important than in communicating safety and danger. 
Emotions are adaptive because they encourage approach and avoidance behaviors from 
the organism (Chen & Bargh, 1999; Davidson, Ekman, Saron, Senulis, & Friesen, 1990). 
For example, fear inducing situations signal to the organism that he or she should 
withdraw and avoid a possible threat (Alexopoulos & Ric, 2007). Likewise, anger is 
thought to be an approach emotion that encourages the organism to eliminate a possible 
threat (Adams & Kleck, 2003; Harmon-Jones & Allen, 1998). 
How Emotions Influence Other People  
 Emotions also transmit the likelihood of approach and avoidance from others 
(Adams, Ambady, Macrae & Kleck, 2006; Ekman, 2003; Marsh, Ambady, & Kleck, 
2005), sometimes in unsurprising and surprising ways. Facial expressions that express 
angry gazes encourage avoidance from others and fearful gazes, contrary to popular 
thought, encourage approach from others (Adams et al., 2006; Marsh et al., 2005; Marsh, 
Adams, & Kleck, 2005). Fearful gazes may encourage approach because they are judged 
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as “rounder, kinder, warmer, more submissive, and more babyish than anger expressions” 
(Marsh, Adams, & Kleck, 2005, p. 122). The ability to decipher the meaning of these 
nonverbal cues (particularly facial expressions of emotion) has been positively related 
with “empathy, affiliation, extraversion, dominance, conscientiousness, openness, 
tolerance for ambiguity, need to belong, better personal relationships, and internal locus 
of control [and…] negatively related to neuroticism, shyness, depression, and an insecure 
attachment style” (Hall, 2010, p. 420). In short, the ability to decipher the meaning of 
nonverbal cues is related to effective interpersonal relationships (Davis & Krauss, 1997; 
Hall, 2010; Hall, Andrzejewski, & Yopchick, 2009) and intrapersonal health. Therefore, 
those individuals who have difficulty deciphering the meaning of nonverbal cues would 
also have less than effective or possibly damaging interpersonal relationships. 
Physiological and Automatic Basis to Emotional Perception 
 The ability to decipher the meaning of other people’s emotions appears to be 
physiologically based. In fact, the ability to recognize different emotions has been found 
to be located among different neural pathways (Murphy, Nimmo-Smith, & Lawrence, 
2003). The neural pathway for fear is generated from the amygdala to the right 
orbitofrontal cortex (Adolphs, 2002). The neural pathway for anger is generated in the 
left inferior frontal lobe, posterior left temporal lobe of the left hemisphere, posterior 
gyrus cinguli of the right hemisphere (Sprengelmeye, Rausch, Eysel, & Przuntek, 1998), 
and right amygdala (Ewbank et al., 2009). Knowing these neural pathways has allowed 
researchers to study neuronal activation in these areas even when fearful stimuli are back 
masked (e.g.,  a presentation of a fearful expression for 33 milliseconds immediately 
followed by a presentation of a neutral facial expression for 167 milliseconds) (Whalen et 
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al., 1998). That the amygdala activates even when back masked indicates that a good 
portion of recognizing emotion is physiological and automatic. Some emotions appear to 
be easier to recognize than other emotions. For example, people are able to recognize 
angry faces faster than happy faces (Fox et al., 2000; Öhman, Lundqvist, & Esteves, 
2001). Despite the physiological basis of emotion recognition, perceiving emotions is not 
always automatic (Edelstei & Gillath, 2008; Fenske & Eastwood, 2003; Horstmann, 
Borgstedt, & Heumann, 2006). Indeed, perceiving other people’s emotions can be 
compromised by cognitive load (Edelstei & Gillath, 2008) and an individual’s conflicting 
emotions (Fenske & Eastwood, 2003; Horstmann et al., 2006), the latter of which will be 
more deeply explored. 
Emotion Contagion, Embodied Cognition, and Facial Feedback 
 It is important to understand the mechanisms of how one perceives other people’s 
emotions. On a rudimentary level, just simply seeing a facial expression of emotion 
causes an emotional reaction (Wicker et al., 2003; Wild, Erb, & Bartels, 2001), can 
change the emotional state (Blairy et al., 1999; Hess & Blairy, 2001; Lundqvist & 
Dimberg, 1995; Wild et al., 2001), and can generate empathy of the person perceiving a 
particular emotion (Hatfield, Rapson, & Le, 2008). In some studies, researchers have 
found that viewing facial expressions of emotion elicits similar facial expressions in the 
participants (Blairy et al., 1999; Dimberg & Thunberg, 1998; Dimberg, Thunberg, & 
Elmehed, 2000; Hess & Blairy, 2001; Lundqvist & Dimberg, 1995; Sloan, Bradley, 
Dimoulas, & Lang, 2002; Weyers, Muhlberger, Hefele, & Pauli, 2006; Wild, et al., 
2001). To pinpoint how similar these facial expressions are, researchers have found that 
participants experience emotion-specific facial electromyographical (EMG) changes 
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when exposed to photos of emotionally expressive faces (Dimberg & Thunberg, 1998; 
Dimberg et al., 2000; Lundqvist, 1995; Lundqvist & Dimberg 1995).  In effect, they 
found that electrical impulses created by facial musculature movements corresponded 
with the emotions expressed on the photos. These facial expressions are difficult to 
suppress when viewing photos of emotionally expressive faces (Dimberg et al., 2002; 
Kappas, Bherer, & Thierault, 2000). This whole process of emotional change due to 
viewing another person’s facial expression of emotion is known as emotion contagion 
(Wild et al., 2001) and can best be explained under the umbrella of embodied cognition 
and the facial feedback hypothesis.  
Embodied cognition.  
 Within the umbrella of embodied cognition, a growing number of researchers are 
studying emotions (Alam, Barrett, Hodapp, & Arndt, 2008; Davis, Senghas, Brandt, & 
Ochsner, 2010; Havas, Glenberg, Gutowski, Lucarelli, & Davidson, 2010; Keysers & 
Gazzola, 2006; Niedenthal, 2007; Preston & de Waal, 2002). The premise behind 
embodied cognition and emotion is that one’s interpretation of other people’s emotions is 
highly dependent upon how one experiences it in his or her body and how one 
experiences it in his or her body colors one’s interpretation of other people’s emotion 
(Niedenthal, 2007). This reciprocal process takes place within the interchange of 
perceptions, physiological changes, and neuronal activations (Niedenthal, 2007). Stated 
differently, when someone experiences an emotion in the presence of situational factors, 
context, physiological responses, and facial movements, those emotions are wired with 
those facial movements. Therefore, seeing another person’s facial expression of emotion 
also produces a physiological response and minute facial movements in that person. In 
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the parlance of mirror neuron research, perceivers experience another person’s emotion 
as if it is their own (Keysers and Gazzola, 2006). Other researchers explain it this way: 
Upon perceiving the facial expression of the object, the subject automatically 
retrieves visual and somatic information that can be used to understand the state 
of the other, or constructs somatosensory representation on-line to simulate the 
state of the target (Preston & de Waal, 2002, p. 14). 
It is suggested that this process of experiencing another person’s emotion is through 
subconscious mimicry in the facial feedback hypothesis (Bailey & Henry, 2009). 
Facial feedback. 
 The facial feedback hypothesis, first suggested by Darwin (1872; 1998), purports 
that physiological changes, particularly the facial musculature, directly impacts emotions. 
As stated previously, activating certain facial musculature groups increases the likelihood 
that one will experience an emotion. Then, experiencing an emotion increases the 
likelihood that facial musculature groups will be activated, creating a positive feedback 
loop (McIntosh, 1996; Rutlege & Hupka, 1985). There are two versions of the facial 
feedback hypothesis. The first one, referred to as the weak version (Bush, Barr, McHugo, 
& Lanzetta, 1989; Laird, 1974; Laird, 1984), posits that currently felt emotions are 
amplified by facial musculature contractions. For example, contracting muscles around 
the cheeks in an upward motion helps to generate a smile. Research indicates that those 
who pose a more genuine smile are more likely to feel an increase in feelings of 
happiness compared to those who pose a fake smile (Soussignan, 2002; Strack, Martin, & 
Stepper, 1988). Likewise, when people pose a disgusted face—characterized by 
wrinkling of the nose and raised cheeks and upper lip—they tend to rate noxious smells 
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with more disgust than those who do not pose (Kraut, 1982). Finally, those who purse 
their lips, tighten their jaws, and glare, report anger intensification more than those who 
did not pose an angry expression (Rutledge & Hupka, 1985). Through these experiments 
and others there appears to be continued support for the weak version of the facial 
feedback hypothesis.  
 The other version, referred to as the strong version, has begun to be researched 
more recently (Duclos & Laird, 2001; Ekman, 2003; Hess, Kappas, McHugo, Lanzetta, & 
Kleck, 1992; Levenson, Ekman, & Friesen, 1990; Levenson, Ekman, & Friesen, 1990; 
Levenson et al., 1992). This version asserts that simply by posing certain facial 
configurations a physiological response can become activated and people will report 
feeling a particular emotion (Duclos & Laird, 2001; Ekman, 2003; Hess et al., 1992; 
Levenson et al., 1990; Levenson et al., 1992).  
However, early researchers begged the question of whether facial musculature 
movements actually produced an emotion or if it was situational factors such as 
becoming aware that a particular pose was linked with happiness or through self-
attribution (e.g., “I am smiling. Therefore, I must be happy.”) (Laird, 1974; Strack et al., 
1988). To test whether participants were genuinely experiencing more positive emotions 
or were identifying an emotion based upon self-attribution Strack and colleagues (1988) 
conducted a study. They asked participants to hold a pen between their teeth, their lips, or 
non-dominant hand while they filled out questionnaires. Among the questionnaires was a 
set of cartoons that participants were to rate on a likert-type scale from “not at all funny 
(0) to very funny (9)” (Strack et al., 1988, pp. 770-771). Results indicated that those who 
held the pen between their teeth (the posed smile) rated the cartoons more positively than 
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those who held the pen between their lips (the posed frown) (Strack et al., 1988). These 
results have been replicated and continue to receive validation (Soussignan, 2002).  
 Furthermore, there continues to be research investigating other emotions and their 
posed correlates (Duncan & Laird, 1977; Duclos, Laird, Schneider, Sexter, Stern & Van 
Lighten, 1989; Hess et al., 1992; Kleinke, Peterson, & Rutledge, 1998; Laird, Cuniff, 
Sheehan, Shulman, & Strum, 1989). It appears that posing facial configurations 
associated with emotions elicits defined emotional experiences. These include: happiness, 
anger, disgust, contempt, sadness, and surprise (Duncan & Laird, 1977; Duclos et al., 
1989; Hess et al., 1992; Kleinke et al., 1998; Laird et al., 1989). In producing these facial 
configurations, mimicry may be the mechanism that elicits these defined emotions. 
Mimicry. 
Mimicry is an autoresponse mechanism that contributes to the facial feedback 
hypothesis (Bailey & Henry, 2009; Bailey, Henry, & Nangle, 2009; Bourgeois & Hess, 
2008; Dimberg & Thunberg, 1998; Dimberg et al., 2002; Sato & Yoshikawa, 2007; Stel 
& Knippenberg, 2008). Similar to embodied cognition, when people view other people’s 
facial expressions of emotion, they experience a physiological response and neuronal 
activation. Then the neuronal activation contracts the corresponding facial expressions of 
the viewers within milliseconds and below conscious awareness. Simply stated, people 
subconsciously mirror other people’s emotions. These automatic facial responses are 
difficult to suppress (Dimberg et al., 2002; Kappas et al., 2000) and can be modulated by 
attitudes (Likowski, Mühlberger, Seibt, Pauli, & Weyers, 2008). For corroborative 
evidence, several studies have recorded specific facial EMG changes when exposed to 
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facial expressions of emotion (Bailey & Henry, 2009; Bailey et al., 2009; Bourgeois & 
Hess, 2008; Dimberg & Thunberg, 1998; Dimberg et al., 2002; Hess & Blairy, 2001).  
Evidence against mimicry. 
Despite the overwhelming evidence of mimicry possibly being the mechanism for 
the facial feedback hypothesis, recent research indicates that mimicry may not be needed 
to recognize and empathize with other people’s emotions (Bogart & Matsumoto, 2010). 
According to this research, people with Moebius Syndrome (congenital face paralysis) 
were just as likely to recognize other people’s emotions as people without Moebius 
Syndrome (Bogart & Matsumoto, 2010). According to Chartrand (as cited in Carey, 
2010, April 6), people with Moebius Syndrome may have learned how to compensate and 
use other means to recognize emotions. In possible support of this statement, other 
researchers (Pistoia et al., 2010) have studied a group of people who have noncongenital 
facial paralysis. These people suffer from locked-in syndrome (LIS), which is severe 
facial paralysis due to lesioning in the ventral pons (Pistoia et al., 2010). The study found 
that people with LIS demonstrated difficulties in recognizing negative emotions such as 
disgust, fear, anger, and sadness when compared to people without LIS (Pistoia et al., 
2010). There was no difference between groups in recognizing happiness or surprise 
(Pistoia et al., 2010). This indicates that people with noncongenital paralysis may, in fact, 
use mimicry to understand other people’s emotions and that this mechanism may be 
disrupted if they experience noncongenital facial paralysis or LIS.  
Additional evidence for mimicry. 
Facial paralysis aside, there is a larger group of people who demonstrably have 
difficulty recognizing other people’s emotions. In general, people with autism have 
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difficulty recognizing emotions in others (Bal et al., 2010; Kuusikko et al., 2009; Phillip 
et al., 2010; Rump, Giovanelli, Minshew, & Strauss, 2009). It has been theorized that 
people with autism may have an inability or difficulty mimicking other people’s facial 
expressions. And, that difficulty may explain why people with autism have a difficulty 
empathizing with others. In a recent research study (Hermans, van Wingen, Bos, Putnam, 
& van Honk, 2009), researchers found that people’s ability to spontaneously mimic 
other’s emotions was dependent upon gender and autistic traits. Women with the least 
amount of autistic traits more easily produced facial expressions consistent with 
identifiable emotions (Hermans et al., 2009). This study illustrates another point; there is 
possibly a continuum on which emotion is able to be perceived. Knowing how impaired 
emotional perception affects interpersonal communication also illustrates the utility of 
mimicry in emotional perception. 
The Effects of Impaired Emotion Perception 
 Being able to perceive other people’s emotions assists in regulating our own 
emotions (Salovey & Mayer, 1990). Additionally, a person’s perception ability is related 
to recognition of specific emotional expressions, such as being able to differentiate 
between anger and fear (Kohler, Tuner, & Stolar, 2004). Moreover, this ability to 
perceive emotions allows individuals to feel empathy toward another person (Mayer, 
DiPaolo, & Salovey, 1990) and encourages different responses, depending on the 
emotion (Keltner & Ekman, 2000). 
For example, when a person expresses happiness, the cheeks are pulled up, 
eyebrows are pulled down in the outer corners, a fold of skin is gathered under the eye, 
and crow’s feet are formed (Kohler et al., 2004; Ekman, 2003; Ekman & Davidson, 
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1993). Smiling is generally associated with attractiveness and kindness (Otta, Abrosio, & 
Hoshino, 1996) and encourages other people to smile and approach people who are 
smiling. People who suffer from depression are less likely to recognize expressions of 
happiness (Flanagan, White, & Carter, 2011; Naranjo et al., 2011; Surguladze, Young, 
Senior, Brebion, Travis, & Phillips, 2004), which means that people who suffer from 
depression are less likely to smile in return and approach another smiling person. In fact, 
research indicates that women with postpartum depression are less likely to recognize 
expressions of happiness than nonpostpartum depressed women (Flanagan, White, & 
Carter, 2011), which means that women with postpartum depression are less likely to 
benefit from another person’s smile. 
 When a person expresses sadness, both the upper and lower eyelids droop, the 
inner corners of the eyebrows are pulled up and in, the outer corners of the mouth are 
pulled downward, and (in some cases) the chin is pulled up upward (Chiba, 1985; 
Ekman, 2003; Kohler et al., 2004). Recognition of this expression usually stimulates 
attention, caretaking, and sympathy (Burgeois & Hess, 2008; Ekman, 2003). People who 
do not recognize this expression may fail to offer sympathy, support, or caregiving 
(Ekman, 2003).  
 When a person expresses  fear, the eyebrows are raised and brought together, the 
top and bottom eyelids are tensed and pulled open, the jaw is dropped slightly, and the 
lips are spread horizontally (Ekman, 2003; Kohler et al., 2004). This expression signifies 
an immediate and possible threat (Adolphs, Russel, & Tranel, 1999; Calder et al., 1996; 
Morris et al., 1996) and may also be related to approach (Marsh, Adams, & Kleck, 2005; 
Marsh et al., 2005), but research is more inconclusive than sadness. 
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 When a person expresses anger, eyebrows are pulled down and together, the top 
and bottom eyes are tensed and pulled open, lips are pursed and tightened, and jaws are 
clenched (Ekman, 2003; Kohler et al., 2004). Anger usually evokes facial and 
physiological characteristics of fear (Esteves, Dimberg, & Ohman, 1994) and often 
signals threat toward the perceiver (Bourgeois & Hess, 2008). Anger can be affiliative 
when expressed toward a shared out-group member (Bourgeois & Hess, 2008). Those 
who perceive anger also experience physiological responses (Ekman, Levenson, & 
Friesen, 1983) such as increased blood pressure (Roberts & Weerts, 1982). Research 
indicates that anger may be more difficult to recognize or “decode” than other emotions 
(Hess, Phillippot, & Blairy, 1998). Therefore, those who have difficulty recognizing 
angry expressions of emotion may miss on cues of aggression and/or danger. These 
people would be less likely to avoid situations that include violence.  
Factors That Inhibit Perception of Emotion 
 As was demonstrated with people who have autistic traits (Bal et al., 2010; 
Kuusikko et al., 2009; Phillip et al., 2010; Rump et al., 2009), individuals differ in 
abilities of recognizing emotions (Bennett, & Hejmadi, 2005; O’Sullivan, 2007; Rozin, 
Taylor, Ross,). These abilities appear to be associated with gender (Hall & Matsumoto, 
2004; Hampson, van Anders, & Mullin, 2006; Thayer & Johnson, 2000), age (Calder et 
al., 2003; Orgeta & Phillips, 2008), medically based procedures and ailments (Adam, 
Barrett, Hodapp, & Arndt, 2008; Davis, Senghas, Brandt, & Ochsner, 2010; Havas, 
Glenberg, Gutowski, Lucarelli, & Davidson, 2010; Pistoia et al., 2010), psychopathology 
(Lynch et al., 2006; Montagne, Schutters, Westenberg, van Honk, Kessels, & de haan, 
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2006; Wagner, Roemer, Orsillo, & Litz, 2003), and culture (Elfenbein & Ambady, 2003; 
Matsumoto & Ekman, 1989). 
Gender. 
 Research indicates that gender is associated with people’s abilities to recognize 
and perceive emotion (Hall & Matsumoto, 2004; Hampson, van Anders, & Mullin, 2006; 
Thayer & Johnson, 2000). Generally speaking, both males and females are faster at 
recognizing anger in males and happiness in females (Becker, Kenrick, Neuberg, 
Blackwell, & Smith, 2007). Overall, though, females appear to perform better at 
recognizing positive and negative emotions (Hall & Matsumoto, 2004; Hampson et al., 
2006) than males and this advantage seems to begin in childhood and continue well into 
adolescence (McClure, 2000). This may occur because females react more strongly to 
emotionally presented stimuli than males (Lundqvist, 1995). Males, though, are better at 
identifying specific emotions such as anger (Wagner, MacDonald, & Manstead, 1986), 
particularly anger presented by other male faces (Rotter & Rotter, 1988).  
Age. 
 As males and females age, it appears that perceptions of emotions become less 
sensitive. It appears that older adults are significantly less sensitive to emotional facial 
cues than younger adults (Calder et al., 2003; Orgeta & Phillips, 2008). These results 
seem to be covaried with age-related cognitive deficits (Orgeta & Phillips, 2008). More 
particularly, older adults experience deficits in recognizing anger (Bailey, Henry, & 
Nangle, 2009; Calder et al., 2003) and fear (Bailey, Henry, & Nangle, 2009; Calder et al., 
2003). This may be due to the fact that older adults also report being happier than 
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younger adults and concentrate on more positive than negative emotions and experiences 
(Gilbert, 2006). 
Medical procedure and facial paralysis. 
 As age increases, so do hospital visits. Hospital visits, though, do not affect 
people’s abilities to recognize emotions. Instead, medical/physiological ailments or 
procedures diminish one’s ability to recognize emotion. One biologically based ailment 
has already been identified: locked-in syndrome (LIS) (Pistoia et al., 2010). LIS is facial 
paralysis due to lesioning of the ventral pons. People with LIS demonstrated more 
difficulty recognizing negative emotions such as fear, anger, and sadness than a 
normative control sample (Pistoia et al., 2010). However, there were no differences 
between the samples in the perception of disgust (Pistoia et al., 2010). 
 Another medical procedure that has received much media attention recently has 
been botulinum toxin, commonly referred to as Botox. As the search for youthfulness has 
increased, many people (notably celebrities) have turned to Botox. This chemical poison 
paralyzes the area in which it is injected. Those who have received Botox also receive a 
dampening of emotional experience (Alam, Barrett, Hodapp, & Arndt, 2008; Davis, 
Senghas, Brandt, and Ochsner, 2010; Hennenlotter et al., 2009; Neal & Chartrand, 2011). 
Additionally, without receiving facial feedback, these individuals take significantly 
longer recognizing negative emotions in language (Havas et al., 2010) and in other 
people’s facial expressions (Davis, Senghas, Brandt, & Ochsner, 2010; Neal & 
Chartrand, 2011). Researchers are just starting to understand how Botox affects people’s 
emotional recognition. Continued research may substantiate the facial feedback 
hypothesis and Botox’s dampening effect upon emotion recognition. 
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Mental disorders and psychopathology. 
 Similar to medical illnesses and treatments, certain mental disorders, illnesses, 
and psychopathology also affect emotion recognition (Blair, Colledge, Murray, and 
Mitchell, 2001; Blair et al., 2001; Bland, Williams, Scharer, & Manning, 2004; Chen et 
al., 2005; Corcoran, Woody, & Tolin, 2008; Davis & Gibson, 2000; Domes et al., 2008; 
Hermans, Wingen, Bos, Putnam, & van Honk, 2009; Lynch et al., 2006; Melfsen, 
Osterlow, & Florin, 2000; Montagne et al., 2006; Renneberg, Heyn, Gebhard, & 
Bachmann, 2005; Surcinelli, Codispoti, Montebarocci, Rossi, & Baldaro, 2006; Wagner 
et al., 2003; Wagner & Linehan, 1999). These disorders and personality traits include: 
borderline personality disorder (Bland, Williams, Scharer, & Manning, 2004; Renneberg, 
Heyn, Gebhard, & Bachmann, 2005), bipolar disorder (Chen et al., 2005), post-traumatic 
stress disorder (Wagner et al., 2003), social anxiety (Melfsen, Osterlow, & Florin, 2000; 
Montagne et al., 2006), obsessive-compulsive disorder (Corcoran, Woody, & Tolin, 
2008), autism spectrum disorders (Hermans, Wingen, Bos, Putnam, & van Honk, 2009), 
paranoid schizophrenia (Davis & Gibson, 2000), and trait anxiety (Surcinelli, Codispoti, 
Montebarocci, Rossi, & Baldaro, 2006). Even though most of the disorders affect 
emotion recognition in general, some disorders or traits selectively affect recognition of 
emotions. For example, as symptoms of obsessive-compulsive disorder become more 
severe, recognition of disgust becomes less likely (Corcoran, Woody, & Tolin, 2008). 
Researchers are still unsure about the cause of these results, but suggest that being highly 
sensitive toward contamination may cause people with OCD symptoms to be less 
sensitive toward expressions of disgust (Corcoran, Woody, & Tolin, 2008). Compared to 
control groups, people with generalized social anxiety disorder were less likely to 
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recognize negative emotions such as anger, sadness, disgust, and fear (Montagne et al., 
2006). Likewise, compared to control groups, children with psychopathy were less likely 
to recognize fearful (Blair et al., 2001) and sad expressions (Blair, Colledge, Murray, and 
Mitchell, 2001). People with borderline personality disorder, however, are faster at 
recognizing anger, happiness (Lynch et al., 2006), and fear (Wagner & Linehan, 1999) 
but also identify neutral stimuli as anger (Domes et al., 2008). In general, mental 
disorders, illnesses, and psychopathy impair emotional perception. However, in the case 
of borderline personality disorder, some disorders appear to create hypersensitivity, even 
providing false positives. 
 Culture. 
 Finally, one of the most encompassing factors that may impair emotional 
perception is culture. It has been generally recognized and established that the basic 
emotions of happiness, sadness, anger, contempt, disgust, surprise and fear are 
universally recognized across cultures (Ekman, 1989; Matsumoto, 1992). There has also 
been an argument for including pride as a basic emotion (Ekman, 2003; Lewis, 2000; 
Tracy and Robins, 2008), which has even been recognized in isolated cultures (Ekman & 
Friesen, 1971). Even if basic emotions are universally recognized, the culture one 
belongs to influences accuracy (Matsumoto, Kasri, & Kooken, 1999; Thibault, 
Bourgeois, & Hess, 2006) and the judgment of emotional intensity (Ekman et al., 1987; 
Matsumoto, 1989). Some researchers argue that it is easier to recognize emotions of an 
in-group member rather than an out-group member (Elfenbein & Ambady, 2002). They 
define in-group members as individuals from the same culture (Elfenbein & Ambady, 
2002; Matsumoto, Olide, & Willingham, 2009), not necessarily delineated by country 
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borders or boundaries (Matsumoto & Hwang, 2010). Recent research indicates that there 
are no differences between in-group and out-group members in ability of recognizing 
spontaneous emotions (Matsumoto, Olide, & Willingham, 2009) but there may be 
differences in posed emotions.  Regardless, Dailey and colleagues (2010) suggest that 
culture influences emotion perception to the degree that a person has exposed himself or 
herself to facial expressions across cultures. The factor that may influence people’s 
abilities to correctly perceive emotions is display rules. 
Display rules. 
 Display rules dictate when and how people should express emotions within a 
culture (Ekman & Friesen, 1975; Matsumoto et al., 2005). For example, it is acceptable 
for females but not males to cry in Western cultures (Plutchik, 2003). The first study to 
validate display rules was conducted by Friesen (1972). In this classic study, American 
and Japanese college students were videotaped while they watched neutral and gory 
films. When they were watching the neutral film, they did not exhibit many facial 
expressions of emotion. However, when watching the gory film, they exhibited facial 
expressions of fear and disgust. This was true only when alone. When the experimenter 
walked into the room, American students continued to display their facial expression of 
emotion but the Japanese students began to display facial expressions consistent with 
happiness. They were smiling. The experimenter’s presence activated their norm of 
deference toward authority figures. This indicates that culture does not influence the 
feeling of these particular emotions. Culture influences the expression of emotion (Fok et 
al., 2008). 
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 First coined by Ekman and Friesen (1969), display rules fall along five categories 
in which they are manipulated (Ekman & Friesen, 1969; 2003). These include: no 
inhibition, deamplifying, amplifying, neutralizing, qualifying, and masking (Ekman & 
Friesen, 1969; 2003). No inhibition is when an individual reveals his or her emotion 
without censoring his or her expression. Deamplifying is when an individual reveals his 
or her emotion with less intensity than what he or she feels. Amplifying is when an 
individual reveals his or her emotion with more intensity than what he or she feels. 
Neutralizing is when an individual reveals nothing about what he or she feels. Qualifying 
is when an individual reveals his or her emotion but smiles to qualify what he or she 
feels. Masking is when an individual displays a different but socially acceptable emotion 
in order to hide how he or she truly feels. These forms of modulation have been validated 
in real world application studies (Ekman & Rosenberg, 1998). 
Mimicry and masking. 
 Just as modulating emotions varies across situations (Matsumoto, Yoo, Hirayam, 
& Petrova, 2005) so, too, does mimicry (Hess & Bourgeois, 2010). It also appears that 
any manipulation of one’s ability to mimic also decreases one’s ability to recognize 
another person’s emotions. It has been found that blocking or suppressing mimicry 
impairs recognition of different emotions (Oberman, Winkielman, & Ramachandran, 
2007).  There is probably no stronger example of blocking or suppressing an emotion 
than through masking. Masking is the displaying of other emotions besides what is being 
felt (Matsumoto et al., 1998).  People learn to mask in ages as young as four years old 
(Cole, 1986), in the presence of authority figures (Underwood et al., 1992) and even 
22 
 
 
 
mask their emotions when a stranger tells an inappropriate, “not funny joke” (Zaalberg, 
Manstead, & Fischer, 2004, p. 191).  
Even though people learn to mask at early ages, there are differences across and 
between cultures about when people mask. In general, in-group members tend to mask 
their negative emotions such as anger, contempt, and disgust toward other in-group 
members (Matsumoto, Takeuchi, Andayani, Kouznetsova, & Krupp, 1998). The 
differences become apparent within a collectivistic versus an individualistic society. 
Collectivists, because of social cohesion, find it more permissible to show angry 
expressions with out-group members but not so much with in-group members 
(Matsumoto, Yoo, & Chung, 2010).  Individualists, because of more availability of and 
less attachment to in-groups, find it less permissible to share angry expressions with out-
group members and, compared to collectivists, share relatively more angry expressions 
with in-group members (Matsumoto, Yoo, & Chung, 2010). Additionally, people from 
less urban, smaller communities mask more often than people from urban communities 
(Matsumoto, Willingham, & Olide, 2009). Alternatively, people from more urban, larger 
communities tend to express and deamplify negative emotions more often than people 
from rural communities (Matsumoto, Willingham, & Olide, 2009). Masking also occurs 
in communities or work places where there is low solidarity and higher relative power 
targets (Diefendorff, Morehart, & Allison, 2010; Matsumoto, 1991; Ravid, Rafaeli, & 
Grandey, 2010). So, for those smaller, rural communities, where there are higher relative 
power targets, masking is more likely to occur.  
Like suppression of mimicry, masking influences other people’s abilities and time 
it takes to recognize anger (Matsumoto, Yoo, & Chung, 2010). According to embodied 
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cognition and facial feedback research, masking may make it difficult to recognize other 
people’s emotions because it may block specific muscle groups from activating specific 
emotions (Davis, Senghas, & Ochsner, 2009). Masking and its effects upon emotional 
recognition reveal that “countries [or cultures] that endorse masking of anger [are] also 
less accurate in recognizing angry expressions” (Matsumoto, Yoo, & Chung, 2010, p. 
133) of others. Matsumoto and colleagues who have studied emotion and culture go on to 
say: 
Unfortunately, there is paucity of cross-cultural research examining actual 
behaviors in general and in relation to elicited emotions such as anger. Thus, the 
theoretical framework we have presented in this section must remain speculative 
until future research can substantiate and/or revise the framework. Such studies 
are sure to provide additional insights into the complex interplay between 
biologically based emotions such as anger with culturally based scripts in 
producing behavior role performances (Matsumoto, Yoo, & Chung, 2010, pp. 
133-134). 
Anger and the Culture of Honor 
 Culturally speaking, nowhere has anger been studied more than within the culture 
of honor (Brown, Osterman, & Barnes, 2009; Cohen, 1998; Cohen, 2009; Cohen & 
Nisbett, 1994; Harinck, Beersma, Hoorne, & Ghauharali, 2008; IJzerman, van Dijk, & 
Gallucci, 2003; Nisbett & Cohen, 1996; Rodriguez Mosquera, Manstead, & Fischer, 
2002; Shackelford, 2005; Timmerman, 2007; Vandello & Cohen, 2003; Vandello, Cohen, 
& Ransom, 2008).  
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Theorized and experimentally validated (Cohen & Nisbett, 1996; Nisbett, 1993), 
the culture of honor has been found within countries ranging from Mexico and Costa 
Rica (Figueredo, Tal, McNeil, & Guillén, 2004), Brazil (Vandello & Cohen, 2008), 
Turkey (Harinck, Beersma, Hoorne, & Ghauharali, 2008; Rodriguez Mosquera, Fischer, 
Manstead, & Zaalberg, 2008), Morocco, (Rodriguez Mosquera, et al., 2008), the 
Netherlands (IJzerman, van Dijk, & Gallucci, 2007), Spain (Rodriguez Mosquera, 
Manstead, & Fischer, 2002), and the Southern regions of the United States (Cohen & 
Nisbett, 1996; Nisbett, 1993; Timmerman, 2007). The culture of honor is constructed 
around the premise that violence is acceptable and encouraged in cases of dishonor 
(Cohen & Nisbett, 1994), particularly in herding societies (Cohen & Nisbett, 1996; 
Nisbett, 1993; Figueredo, Tal, McNeil, & Guillen, 2004) where there was a weak law 
enforcement and legal system (Cohen & Nisbett, 1996; Nisbett, 1993). Herding societies 
are punctuated with nomadic lifestyles and tenuous land and property ownership (Cohen 
& Nisbett, 2004; Fiske, 2004; Nisbett, 1993). These factors, plus the week law 
enforcement and legal system combine to create a wellspring of violence (Cohen & 
Nisbett, 1996; Nisbett, 1993). The culture of honor is associated with family honor 
(Rodriguez Mosquera, Manstead, & Fischer, 2002), respect and shame (Harinck, 
Beersma, Hoorne, & Ghauharali, 2008; Rodriguez Mosquera et al., 2008), revenge 
(Brown et al., 2009; Figueredo, Tal, McNeil, & Guillén, 2004; Harinck, Beersma, 
Hoorne, & Ghauharali, 2008), collectivism (Cohen, 2009; Vandello & Cohen, 1999), 
corporeal punishment (Cohen & Nisbett, 1994), norms toward defending honor (Cohen & 
Nisbett, 1994), and masculinity and female fidelity roles (Vandello & Cohen, 2008). 
Factors, such as being more collectivistic (Cohen, 2009; Vandello & Cohen, 1999), made 
25 
 
 
 
up of less urban, smaller (rural) communities (Nisbett& Cohen, 1996) and weaker law 
enforcement and legal system—which leads to more uncertain relative power targets—
than the North, lead one to believe that the Southern culture of honor is similar to other 
cultures that purportedly use masking. Similarities between the culture of honor and other 
cultures include being characterized as being collectivistic (Matsumoto, Yoo, & Chung, 
2010), less urban, smaller communities (Matsumoto, Willingham, & Olide, 2009), and 
having high relative power targets (Diefendorff, Morehart, & Allison, 2010; Matsumoto, 
1991; Ravid, Rafaeli, & Grandey, 2010). 
Despite mounting evidence supporting the culture of honor, Chu and associates 
(2000), contest the genesis of the culture of honor within the Southern United States, 
asserting that herding cultures are not associated with increased violence. When these 
researchers controlled for temperature, rurality, and socioeconomic status, they found that 
there was a weak correlation between the culture of honor and violence/homicide (Chu, 
Rivera, & Loftin, 2000). They also explain that white poverty explains more of the 
homicide variance (Chu et al., 2000) than any other factor. Despite such claims, Chu and 
associates (2000) note that the culture of honor and its relationship with violence is a 
prominent feature of many different societies.  Regardless of whether or not the culture of 
honor is tied with herding societies, recent research (Brown, Osterman, & Barnes, 2009; 
Cohen, 2009) indicates that the culture of honor is a more stable factor than socio-
economic status, temperature, and rurality in relationship with violence. 
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Factors That Maintain the Culture of Honor 
Still, Chu and associates (2000) raise an important point. If the culture of honor 
began in herding societies, how is the culture of honor currently maintained in the 
Southern United States? Many people within the South no longer herd. 
In the Southern culture of honor, Southerners hold to a set of beliefs, ideals, and 
cognitions about the appropriate use of violence (Nisbett, 1993). In the context of these 
beliefs, laws and court proceedings condone violence more in Southern states than in 
Northern states, especially in cases of protection, female fidelity, and property (Nisbett & 
Cohen, 1996; Vandello & Cohen, 2003).  
Beliefs, ideals, and cognitions about the appropriateness of violence are 
perpetuated through socialization. Like other cultures, socialization begins at a young age 
(Brown, Osterman, & Barnes, 2009). Physical punishment toward children is viewed 
more acceptable among Southerners than among non-Southerners (Cohen & Nisbett, 
1996; Nisbett, 1993). Even children in elementary and high school begin to identify with 
the culture of honor (Brown, Osterman, & Barnes, 2009). Anecdotally, teenagers are 
encouraged to maintain an air of toughness, to act with violence and without thought 
when slighted or dishonored (Nisbett, 1989).  
Along with socialization, the culture of honor is maintained through institutions 
such as the legal system (e.g., lax gun control laws and lower sentencing for homicides 
due to self-defense or honor) (Cohen, 1996), media outlets (e.g., non-stigmatization of 
violent crimes related to honor) (Cohen & Nisbett, 1997), norms of protecting social 
worth in low-status societies (Henry, 2009), protection and violent responses to insults 
(Nisbett, 1993), and a misperception that peers endorse more violence and aggression 
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than the individual, allowing the individual to feel justified in attacking another person 
(Vandello, Cohen, & Ransom, 2008). Finally, Cohen and colleagues (1999) have found 
that norms for politeness help to maintain and perpetuate violence within the culture of 
honor.  
The culture of honor and masking. 
Seeking to understand how politeness and aggression share a reciprocal 
relationship, Cohen and his colleagues (1999) hypothesized that due to an “undercurrent 
of violence” (p. 258), Southerners encourage an overabundance of politeness and 
hospitality as norms. These norms are put into place to stifle possible misunderstandings 
and potential violence (Cohen et al., 1999).  They assert that cultures that emphasize 
politeness as a means to avoid conflict do not equip individuals with rituals to signal their 
anger (Cohen et al., 1999). Instead, these individuals learn to mask their underlying 
emotions until it becomes too late and they aggress in a more violent manner (Cohen et 
al., 1999).  
Results of their study confirmed their hypotheses. Northerners, defined as white 
males from Northern Illinois, signaled increasing amounts of hostility as they were 
insulted but relented when insults continued (Cohen et al., 1999). Alternatively, 
Southerners, defined as white males “who had spent one-third of their lives in the South 
or Southern Illinois,” (Cohen et al., 1999, p. 261) did not signal increasing amounts of 
hostility, presenting “a polite face.” The reason for including Southern Illinois as part of 
the south was because the researchers noted that the region’s cultural viewpoints, meal 
choices, immigration patterns, and traditions are consistent with Southern viewpoints, 
meal choices, immigration patterns, traditions, etc (Cohen et al., 1999). The South was 
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also comprised of “Alabama, Arkansas, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Kentucky, 
Louisiana, Maryland, Mississippi, Missouri, North Carolina, Oklahoma, South Carolina, 
Tennessee, Texas, Virginia, and West Virginia” (Cohen et al., 1999, p. 261). For this 
study, hostility was defined as anger-minus-amusement displays of emotion (Cohen et al., 
1999). Meaning, observers gave scores according to expressions of anger minus 
expressions of amusement as participants were insulted. Over a longer period of time, 
Southerners displayed outbursts of hostility and violence at more intense levels than 
Northerners, including two occurrences of physical altercations (Cohen et al., 1999).  
As a continuation of this study, Cohen and colleagues (1999) conducted a study 
examining whether or not Southerners had more difficulty recognizing signals of hostility 
compared to Northerners. Participants viewed video segments of the previous study, 
including the videos containing the physical altercations. The videos were stopped before 
displaying the physical altercations (Cohen et al., 1999). Once again, hostility was 
defined as anger-minus-amusement displays of emotion (Cohen et al., 1999). Participants 
rated the video segments using the anger-minus-amusements scores. Results indicated 
that Southerners were less likely than Northerners to recognize signals of hostility (Cohen 
et al., 1999). In other words, Southerners also lacked the resources to recognize 
expressions of anger because they are not taught the cues that signal anger. 
It appears, though, that anger is not the only emotional expression that people 
within the culture of honor have difficulty recognizing. People from honor societies are 
also less likely to recognize fearful and sad facial expressions (IJzerman, van Dijk, & 
Gallucci, 2007). Southerners also see less anger or hostility than Northerners (Cohen, 
Vandello, Puente, & Rantilla, 1999). Other research indicates that people within the 
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culture of honor are more likely than people outside the culture of honor to engage in 
future aggression and are less likely to recognize expressions of happiness when 
dishonored or primed with an insult (Cohen, Nisbett, Bowdle, & Schwarz, 1996).  
To date, researchers have identified some factors that inhibit emotion perception 
sensitivity within culture such as in-groups versus out-groups. Research concerning 
emotion and culture has focused primarily on display rules. Little research has focused on 
masking anger and its effect upon emotion perception. Matsumoto and colleagues (2010) 
have suggested cultures that mask anger are generally less accurate at correctly 
recognizing specific emotions. However, there is a lack of research directly studying 
masking anger within or across cultures (Matsumoto, Yoo, & Chang, 2010). The culture 
of honor, characterized by anger and violence, has been studied to determine how the 
culture continues to be maintained. Research has focused on socialization (Brown, 
Osterman, & Barnes, 2009; Cohen & Nisbett, 1996; Nisbett, 1993; Nisbett, 1989), 
institutions (Cohen, 1996), media outlets (Cohen & Nisbett, 1997); and norms (Cohen et 
al., 1999; Henry, 2009; Nisbett, 1993; Vandello, Cohen, & Ransom, 2008) to explain 
how the culture of honor is maintained. Few studies, though, have examined factors at an 
interpersonal level (Cohen, Vandello, Puente, & Rantilla, 1999). It has been suggested 
that honor societies may not have the cultural “tool kits” or interpersonal resources to 
signal and recognize negative expressions of emotion, such as anger, fear, and sadness 
(Cohen, Vandello, Puente, & Rantilla, 1999). The lack of interpersonal resources to 
signal and recognize negative emotions may be due to masking. The current study 
attempted to address gaps in the masking and culture of honor literature. The purpose of 
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the current study was to examine the effect of the culture of honor and masking on the 
speed and accuracy of recognizing emotions, particularly anger. 
Overview of Current Study 
In order to determine whether or not the culture of honor causes masking, which 
causes a decrease in emotion perception, it was important to determine a causal 
relationship among these variables. Spencer and colleagues (2005) asserted that it is best 
to determine a causal link between the mediating variable and the independent variable 
using an experimental-causal-chain design, particularly when one can manipulate both 
the mediating and independent variables (See Figure 1.). MacKinnon and Fairchild 
(2009) suggested using a blockage design, a type of experimental-causal-chain design. A 
blockage design allows for the mediating variable to be present in one experimental 
condition but not another experimental condition (MacKinnon & Fairchild, 2009). In 
effect, the mediator is blocked (See Figure 2.).  
To apply a blockage design to this study, we would need the ability to manipulate 
masking and the culture of honor. The experimental design would need to be set up so 
that masking and its effects are present in one condition and not in another condition. 
Furthermore, when masking is blocked, its effects should also be blocked or not present 
at all. In this blockage design, cause and effect would have to be established by showing  
that masking influences emotion perception. Second, we would need to show that when 
masking is not present, there is no influence on emotion perception. Third, we would 
need to show that the culture of honor (with masking present) influences emotion 
perception. Fourth, we would need to show that the culture of honor (with masking not 
present) has minimal to no effect upon emotion perception. If all four conditions are met, 
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we can infer that masking is a mediator between the culture of honor and emotion 
perception. If masking occurs within the culture of honor, which affects emotion 
perception, we can infer that the culture of honor causes masking, which affects emotion 
perception 
Because masking occurs within a social context (Diefendorff & Greguras, 2009; 
Keltner, 1995; Matsumoto & Kupperbusch, 2001; Soussignan & Schaal, 1996; 
Underwood et al., 1992; Zaalberg et al., 2004) and is difficult to control in more 
naturalistic settings, masking would need to be simulated. In order for a simulation of 
masking to occur, a person needs to experience a felt emotion other than the expressed 
emotion. In other words, there needs to be a contrasted effect between what is felt and 
what is expressed. Additionally, a person within the culture of honor is more likely to 
express a masked emotion in the presence of other people. Being in the presence of other 
people would also cause difficulties measuring what types of emotions were presented to 
the subject. Therefore, we will be artificially inducing masking while participants are 
shown previously selected stimuli.  
This study used a 2 (prime: Culture of Honor vs. none) by 2 (expression of 
emotion: mask vs. mimic) blockage design (MacKinnon & Fairchild, 2009).  Consistent 
with the blockage design (MacKinnon & Fairchild, 2009), participants were randomly 
assigned to one of four conditions. In the culture of honor prime/mask (mediating 
variable) condition, after being primed with the culture of honor (through the use of 
questionnaires and scenarios) (Figueredo, Tal, McNeil, & Guillen, 2004; Rodriguez 
Mosquera et al., 2008; Rodriguez Mosquera, Manstead, & Fischer, 2002), participants 
were asked to hold a pen in between their teeth to simulate masking. It was expected that 
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participants within this condition would take significantly longer to correctly recognize 
the expressed emotion. Participants may perceive an emotion and take longer to 
recognize an emotion due to the combination of culture of honor norms and the blocking 
of facial feedback with masking. In the mask/no prime (mediating variable) condition 
(See Figure 1.), participants were asked to hold a pen in between their teeth to simulate 
masking while completing the task. Participants in this condition were expected to find it 
difficult to correctly identify the expression of emotion due to masking. In the 
mimic/culture of honor condition, participants were primed for the culture of honor but 
were allowed to mimic the observed facial expressions of emotion. Participants in this 
condition would not have experienced a decreased ability to correctly identify facial 
expressions of emotion. Finally, in the mimic/no prime condition, participants were asked 
to pay close attention to the observed facial expressions of emotion. Because masking 
usually occurs within a social context (Diefendorff & Greguras, 2009; Keltner, 1995; 
Matsumoto & Kupperbusch, 2001; Soussignan & Schaal, 1996; Underwood et al., 1992; 
Zaalberg et al., 2004) and is artificially simulated in this study, asking participants to pay 
close attention to the observed facial expressions of emotion should automatically lead to 
mimicking. Due to their ability to mimic unobstructed, people within this condition 
should not have experienced difficulty correctly identifying facial expressions of 
emotion. 
Defining Variables 
Masking. 
 For the purposes of this experiment, masking was defined as holding a pen 
between the teeth without allowing the lips to touch the pen. This manipulation causes 
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participants to use the same muscles that are formed when smiling and interrupts the 
process of masking but does not produce an emotional state of happiness (Niedenthal, 
Brauer, Halberstadt, & Innes-Ker, 2001). This manipulation is also similar to facial 
expressions a person who has been insulted within the culture of honor would make: 
“smiling to help cover the expression of negative emotions in the mouth area” but not in 
the eyes (Ekman and Friesen, 1982, p. 247). 
Mimicking. 
 For the purposes of this experiment, mimicking was defined as one’s natural 
automatic response when observing an emotion.  
Hypotheses 
Main Effect of Masking 
 Hypothesis 1 stated that participants who were randomly assigned to mask would 
take significantly longer than participants in the control (mimic) condition at correctly 
perceiving and identifying emotions. In other words, it was predicted that masking would 
cause a decreased ability to correctly perceive and identify emotions when compared to 
those who were allowed to mimic. 
Main Effect of the Culture of Honor 
Hypothesis 2 stated that participants primed with the culture of honor would not 
take significantly longer than participants in the control condition (no prime) at correctly 
perceiving and identifying emotions. In other words, there should be no difference in 
ability to correctly perceive and identify emotions between those who were primed with 
the culture of honor and those who were not primed with the culture of honor. The 
reasoning behind this hypothesis is that within the culture of honor, masking is the 
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mediator of decreased emotion perception sensitivity. Therefore, if masking is isolated 
out, we should not see a difference between the culture of honor and the control group. 
Interaction Effect between Masking and the Culture of Honor 
Hypothesis 3 stated that participants in the culture of honor prime/mask condition 
would take significantly longer than participants in the control condition at correctly 
perceiving and identifying emotions. In other words, there would be an interactive effect 
of culture of honor prime and masking in correctly perceiving and identifying emotions. 
Participants in culture of honor prime condition would take significantly longer correctly 
perceiving emotions than the no culture of honor prime/mask condition, or no culture of 
honor prime/mimic condition only when paired with masking. Finally, participants in the 
control condition would take a significantly shorter amount of time at correctly 
perceiving and identifying emotions. 
Main Effect of Emotion 
 Hypothesis 4 stated that there would be a difference in participants’ abilities to 
correctly perceive and identify emotions based upon the presented emotion (i.e., sadness, 
happiness, anger, surprise, fear, and disgust).  It was hypothesized that participants would 
take longer at correctly perceiving and identifying emotions of anger than any other 
emotion.   
Interaction between Experimental Condition and Emotion 
 Hypothesis 5 stated that participants in the culture of honor prim/mask condition 
would take significantly longer to correctly identify the emotion of anger than any other 
participants. 
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Masking as Mediation 
 Hypthesis 6 stated that if conditions of hypotheses 1 through 4 were met, it could 
be inferred that emotion perception sensitivity was dependent upon the mediator of 
masking. In other words, if the effects of decreased emotion perception are present in the 
culture of honor prime/mask group but not present in the culture of honor prime/mimic 
group, we can infer that participants who were primed with the culture of honor, would 
mask, resulting in decreased emotion perception sensitivity.  
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CHAPTER III 
METHODS 
Participants 
The current study was approved by the Institutional Review Board of Georgia 
Southern University prior to data collection. Participants were drawn from the local 
undergraduate student population enrolled in Introduction to Psychology and upper level, 
undergraduate psychology courses. They were able to sign up for the experiment through 
SONA Systems, supported by the psychology department. Each participant received 1.5 
hours of credit for participating in the study and all participant identification was kept 
confidential. A total of 111 male (68.8%) and female undergraduate students participated 
in the study. After removing data due to missed data, theoretical underpinnings, and 
outliers, data analysis was conducted using 81 participants. The demographics for this 
sample were 59 male (69.4%) and 26 female participants. The participants’ average age 
was 19.45 years (SD = 1.14) and consisted of 49 participants (57.6%) who identified 
themselves as Caucasian, 29 as African-American, 4 as Asian/Pacific Islander, 2 as 
Multiracial, and 1 as Latino.  
Measures  
 Research participants completed a demographic questionnaire at the end of the 
study; gathering information such as birthplace, years lived in the south, state of 
residency, age, gender, etc. Included with this questionnaire was a question asking 
participants what they thought was being studied. 
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Research participants completed three questionnaires that have been validated to 
measure the culture of honor and induce thoughts consistent with being insulted or 
dishonored (Figueredo et al., 2004; Rodriguez Mosquera et al., 2002; Rodriguez 
Mosquera et al., 2008). These questionnaires were used to prime participants with the 
culture of honor.  First, the Culture of Honor Questionnaire was validated primarily on a 
Central American population and was tested on populations in Arizona and Spain 
(Figueredo et al., 2004). The questionnaire was comprised of reciprocity and revenge 
scales, with an initial correlation of .26, indicating that they are two distinct scales and 
constructs. The reciprocity scale, though, lacked internal consistency. Therefore, it was 
useful to use the revenge scale to assist in studying the culture of honor. The revenge 
scale is comprised of 16 items and asks respondents to evaluate whether another person’s 
actions were justified in different revenge seeking behaviors. The questionnaire uses a 6-
point Likert-type scale with +3 indicating that the person “did much less than he/she 
should have done” in the scenario and a -3 indicating that the person “did much more 
than he/she should have done” in the scenario. In previous research, the revenge scale 
demonstrated internal consistency with Cronbach’s alphas from .76 to .87 in the U.S.A., 
Spain, Mexico, and Costa Rica populations (Figueredo et al., 2004). For this study, 
Cronbach’s alpha was .83. 
 The second questionnaire, the Honour Concerns Questionnaire (Rodriguez 
Mosquera et al., 2002) is comprised of 4 scales, concerns for family honor, integrity, 
masculine honor, and feminine honor. Their internal consistency ranges from .70 to more 
than .80 (Rodriguez Mosquera et al., 2002). For this study, Cronbach’s alpha was .94. 
Participants were instructed to imagine how their self-esteem would be negatively 
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affected by another person’s actions, particularly if someone slighted their reputations. 
Participants rate 28 imagined scenarios on a 7-point Likert-type scale, ranging from 0 to 
6 (0 = not at all and 6 = very much).  Participants scoring high on the concern for family 
honor scale indicate more intense emotions of anger and shame accompanied with the 
threat to family honor vignette. Participants scoring high on the scale and vignette 
indicate higher culture of honor endorsement. 
The third questionnaire, a shorter Honour Value scale (Rodriguez Mosquera et al., 
2008), contained 5 items asking participants how much they value positive evaluation 
and respect from others. This scale is measured on a 5-point Likert-type scale ranging 
from 1 to 5 (1 = not at all and 5 = extremely important) (Rodriguez Mosquera et al., 
2008). For this study, Cronbach’s alpha was .78. 
Cronbach’s alpha for all items combined across the three questionnaires was .91. 
Therefore, we decided to average the 3 scales together. The combined average scale was 
used for participants who were primed with the culture of honor. We expected that the 
completion of these measures would not activate the same levels of the culture of honor 
across all participants.  Instead, we predicted that some participants primed with the 
culture of honor would indicate a high endorsement of this cultural norm and some 
participants primed with the culture of honor would indicate a low endorsement of this 
cultural norm.  We expected that this differential level of endorsement would affect 
emotion detection. Specifically, we predicted that high culture of honor endorsers would 
take significantly longer correctly perceiving expressions of anger than low culture of 
honor endorsers. For more information on the culture of honor scales, see Table 1 
(Appendix B) 
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Before beginning the questionnaires, all participants were given the following 
instructions as a cover story: 
Due to the short length of the experiment, another researcher has asked that you 
complete another set of questionnaires focusing on how you might respond in 
different situations or to how much you agree with another person’s actions. 
Please take your time as you answer all of the questions. 
The Emotional Expression Multimorph Task (EEMT) (Blair et al., 2001) is a tool 
that measures the speed and accuracy with which participants recognize emotions. The 
video sequences in this task were created utilizing the Pictures of Facial Affect (POFA) 
(Ekman & Friesen, 1976), which have been empirically validated as full expressions of 
emotions (Ekman & Friesen, 1976) and have been adapted from a morphing technique 
created by Perrett, May, and Yoshikawa (1994). The sequences were comprised of the six 
emotional expressions (i.e., sad, anger, happy, surprise, fear, and disgust). These 
sequences begin with neutral expressions of emotion and continue to morph into 100% 
expressed emotions, posed equally by males and females from different cultural 
backgrounds. Sequences are randomized across participants. 
Before beginning the task, all participants were given the following instructions: 
On the computer screen you will be presented with a series of faces. At the 
beginning of each sequence, you will see a face with a neutral or blank facial 
expression. You will see the facial expression change until it reveals an emotion 
of happiness, sadness, anger, disgust, surprise, or fear. You are to click on the 
emotion button that best corresponds with the presented emotion. Remember that 
this is a timed task. So, please click on the correct emotion as soon as possible. 
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However, you will be able to change your mind throughout the sequence as much 
as you want. Once the picture has completed its sequence, you will be asked to 
make your final decision. 
 The measure on this performance was the reaction time it took for the participant 
to recognize and correctly identify the emotion. Their first decision was recorded as well 
as their final decision. Their first decision was used to determine the participant’s 
emotional sensitivity, testing for response bias which may cause some participants to 
respond without actually identifying the facial expression of emotion. Finally, the 
participants overall accuracy was measured by allowing them to make a final decision. 
Procedures 
At the beginning of the experiment, all participants were provided with written 
informed consent. Afterward, participants were asked to sit in front of the computer and 
listen or follow the instructions on the computer screen. For the priming conditions, 
participants completed the culture of honor questionnaires on the computer before the 
participating in the Emotional Expression Multimorph Task (EEMT). Participants were 
informed that due to the brevity of the experiment another researcher asked that 
participants fill out questionnaires regarding their attitudes toward different thoughts and 
reactions toward other people. After completing the questionnaires, the students were 
asked to participate in the EEMT, following the instructions as indicated above. 
Immediately following these instructions, the participants received a set of instructions 
based upon their random assignment (culture of honor prime/mask; culture of honor 
prime/mimic, no culture of honor prime/mask no culture of honor prime/mimic).  
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Masking instructions. 
Participants randomized to the mask and mask/culture of honor prime conditions 
received the following instructions: 
As you complete the following task, we would ask that you place this pen in your 
mouth, holding it in between your teeth, making sure that you do not touch the 
pen with your lips. We are testing to see if this distraction task affects the amount 
of time it takes for you to recognize the correct emotion. You will be given an 
opportunity in between sequences to reposition the pen if you become tired. The 
pen will be yours to keep in appreciation for your participation in this study. I will 
demonstrate to ensure that you are holding the pen in your mouth correctly. I will 
check every once in a while to make sure that you are holding the pen correctly. 
Mimicking instructions.  
Participants randomized to the mimic and mimic/culture of honor prime received 
the following instructions.  
As you complete the following task, we would ask that you pay attention as much 
as possible. You will be given an opportunity in between sequences to relax if you become 
tired. 
Each participant was presented with four trials of each of the six emotions, 
equaling 24 trials. These trials were counterbalanced to account for order effects. Each 
multimorph trial began with a neutral face (0% emotional expression) and morphed until 
it reached a full expression (100% emotional expression) of sadness, happiness, anger, 
fear, surprise, or disgust. Each trial took approximately 20 seconds to complete its 
morphing sequence. The multimorph trial was presented uninterrupted and was in full 
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view of the participant until the participant made his or her final decision. Participants 
were able to click on any of the six desired emotion buttons. Participants were also able 
to change their mind and click on any of the other emotion buttons as the sequence 
progressed. Finally, once the participant made his or her final decision, the image 
disappeared and was replaced by a blank screen. If needed, the blank screen allowed the 
participant to reposition the pen in their teeth. Immediately following the EEMT, 
participants in priming conditions completed the culture of honor questionnaires on the 
computer. All participants completed the demographics before debriefing. Finally, 
participants were debriefed about the true nature of the study and allowed to ask 
questions regarding the experiment. 
Data Analysis 
 This study was a 2 (emotional expression: mask vs. mimic) X 2 (Prime: Culture 
of Honor prime vs. no prime) X 6 (emotion) mixed design with repeated measures on the 
last factor. The dependent variable was the reaction time correctly identifying an emotion 
(sensitivity to emotional expressions). The experimental conditions consisted of four 
groups (culture of honor prime/mask; culture of honor prime/mimic, no culture of honor 
prime/mask no culture of honor prime/mimic). The within subjects variable was a 
repeated measure that consisted of six levels of emotion (sadness, happiness, anger, fear, 
surprise, and disgust). Each emotion was presented on four occasions, yielding a total of 
24 trials.   
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Results were examined for distribution normality (skewness and kurtosis). Next, 
data were analyzed using a 2 X 2 X 6 (sadness, happiness, anger, fear, surprise, and 
disgust) repeated measures mixed ANOVA, examining univariate comparisons of 
emotions to determine if masking influenced participants recognition accuracy and speed 
of anger .  
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CHAPTER IV 
RESULTS 
Normality of Distribution 
 Before completing the primary analysis, data was examined for missing data, 
theoretical underpinnings, and distribution normality. First, 22 participants were removed 
because the experimental program terminated before these participants could complete 
the study. Second, 5 participants were removed because they were transplants from 
Northern States and did not live in the South more than six years (Cohen, Nisbett, 
Bowdle, & Schwarz, 1996). Third, the dependent variables (e.g., the six emotions and 
sensitivity to emotional expressions) were examined for distribution normality.  
Examining distribution normality included, identifying outliers, examining 
skewness and kurtosis, transforming data, and examining transformed data for skewness 
and kurtosis. First, four extreme outliers were identified. Three participants took 
considerable amounts of time correctly identifying the emotions (some taking an 
additional 40 seconds after the full expression was presented). One of these outliers was 
in the no prime/mimic group. Two of these outliers were in the no prime/mask group. 
The final outlier was eliminated due to identifying the emotions too quickly, more than 
half the time using a response set. This participant was from the no prime/mimic group. 
Excluding these data points, provided 81 participants for further analysis. Examining 
skewness and kurtosis revealed that data on four of the six emotions were moderately
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positively skewed. Data were square root transformed. The revised distributions 
improved in size and shape and were within considerable limits. 
Gender Covariate 
 Because previous research indicates there is a relationship between emotion 
perception and gender (Hall & Matsumoto, 2004; Hampson, van Anders, & Mullin, 2006; 
Thayer & Johnson, 2000) with females generally performing better than males (Hall & 
Matsumoto, 2004; Hampson et al., 2006), gender was examined to determine if there was 
a difference among this sample. Furthermore, even though previous research theoretically 
centers on the male Culture of Honor, recent research has begun to identify females’ roles 
in the culture of honor (Nisbett & Cohen, 1996; Vandello & Cohen, 2003; Vandello, 
Cohen, Grandon, & Franiuk, 2009). Therefore, independent samples t tests were initiated. 
No significant differences were found between males and females on emotion perception, 
t(79) = -0.25, p = .80. Due to this result, females were not eliminated from the primary 
analysis and gender was not controlled for as a covariate.  
Even though there were no differences found between males and females on 
emotion perception we decided to analyze the data more in depth. Previous research 
shows that males and females are faster at recognizing anger in males and happiness in 
females (Becker, Kenrick, Neuberg, Blackwell, & Smith, 2007) and males are better than 
females at identifying anger presented by other male faces (Rotter & Rotter, 1988). 
Therefore, it would stand to reason that there may be an interaction between the 
participant’s gender and the stimulus gender.  
We conducted a 2 (gender: male vs. female) X 12 (stimuli gender) repeated-
measures analysis of variance to examine the effect of the stimuli gender on the 
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participant’s ability to correctly perceive emotions. We anticipated results consistent with 
previous research: that males will be quicker than females at identifying anger in other 
males and that females will be quicker than males at identifying happiness in females. 
There was a significant multivariate effect, F(1, 80) = 13.94, p < .001, partial η2 = .69. 
There was a main effect for stimuli gender F(11, 80) = 12.78, p < .001, partial η2 = .14, 
but not for participant gender F(1, 80) = .001, p = .97, partial η2 = .00. There was, 
however, an interaction effect F(1, 80) = 1.92, p = .033, partial η2 = .02. Further analysis 
using independent samples t-tests was utilized to examine differences between the six 
emotions and gender. Of all the emotions, it took males (M = 17108.5, SD = 9966.49) 
significantly longer than females (M =12692.30, SD = 5012.78) to correctly identify 
disgust in female stimuli, t(79) = 2.02, p = .047. These findings add more understanding 
to what type of emotions across genders may cause difficulties at correctly perceiving 
emotions. 
Race Covariate 
 Because previous research indicates that the culture of honor among African 
Americans is not isolated to one geographical area (Nisbett & Cohen, 1996; Shackelford, 
2005), data was analyzed with independent samples t tests to ensure there were no 
significant differences between Caucasian and African-Americans on emotion 
perception. No significant differences were found between Caucasian (M = 15524.38, SD 
= 3461.24) and African-Americans (M = 15465.52, SD = 4660.07), t(73) = -0.29, p = .77. 
Due to this result, African-Americans were not eliminated from the primary analysis and 
race was not controlled for as a covariate. 
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Differences in Emotion Perception Sensitivity 
 A 2 (emotional expression: mask vs. mimic X 2 (Prime: Culture of Honor prime 
vs. no prime) X 6 (emotion) repeated-measures mixed design analysis of variance was 
conducted to examine the effects of masking and the Culture of Honor on reaction time 
of correctly identifying an emotion (sensitivity to emotional expressions). Analysis 
indicated a significant multivariate effect, F(4, 77) = 32.31, p < .001, partial η2 = .68. 
There was also a significant main effect for emotional expression, F(1, 77) = 4.16, p = 
.045, partial η2 = .05.  Between-groups comparisons for emotional expression revealed 
that the mask group (M = 15964.32, SD = 3840.07) were significantly slower than the 
mimic group (M = 14415.15, SD = 3731.87) at correctly identifying emotions, t(79) = 
3.86, p = .05. There was not a significant main effect of prime, F(1, 77) = .189, p = .66, 
partial η2 = .002. The prime group (M = 15071.92, SD = 4067.67) and no prime group (M 
= 15560 SD = 3686.39) were of nearly equivalent speed in correctly identifying 
emotions. The emotional expression X prime interaction was also not significant, F(1, 
77) = 2.66, p = .107, partial η2 = .03. For more information, see Table 2 (Appendix B).  
One reason why there may not have been an interaction between the culture of 
honor and masking could be due to individual differences among the participants and 
their views toward the culture of honor. To examine these differences we separated 
participants among low and high culture of honor endorsers, using the culture of honor 
scales previously mentioned. We hypothesized that participants who were primed and 
who scored high on the culture of honor scales would take significantly longer than 
participants who were primed and who scored low on the culture of honor scales at 
correctly identify the correct emotions. The dependent measure was reaction time in 
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milliseconds. We conducted a one way ANOVA to test this hypothesis with an 
independent variable of culture of honor endorsement (high vs. low vs. no prime groups). 
Analysis indicated a significant effect, F(2, 78) = 6.19, p = .003, partial η2 = .14, such 
that low culture of honor endorsers (M = 19965.77, SD = 4716.44) took significantly 
longer than high culture of honor endorsers (M = 14588.91, SD = 4352.02) and those 
who were not primed with the culture of honor (M = 15741.32, SD = 5362.9).  
 Next, the main effect of the emotion on emotion perception was examined. 
Analysis indicated that there was a significant main effect for emotion, F(5, 77) = 33.37, 
p < .001, partial η2 = .30. Further analysis using independent samples t-tests was utilized 
to examine differences between emotional perception of anger and other emotions. It 
took significantly longer for participants to recognize anger (M = 16451.77, SD = 
5299.61) only when compared to happy (M = 11460.63, SD = 5473.89), t(80) = -5.89, p < 
.001, and surprise (M = 14280.82, SD = 5376.69), t(80) = -2.73, p = .011, but not when 
compared to sad (M = 15995.39, SD = 5368.09), fear (M = 16800.34, SD = 4382.27), or 
disgust (M = 16682.50, SD = 4585.88), all p’s > .05. For comparisons between other 
emotions, refer to Table 3 (Appendix B). 
 Finally, the interaction between experimental conditions and emotion was 
examined to determine what emotions contributed to difficulties in correctly perceiving 
and identifying emotions across conditions.  The emotion expression X prime X emotion 
was not significant, F(5, 77) = 1.10, p = .36, partial η2 = .014.   No further analysis could 
be made to determine difficulties in correctly perceiving and identifying emotions across 
conditions. 
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CHAPTER V 
DISCUSSION 
Our overall first hypothesis was that participants who mask will take significantly 
longer than participants in the control (mimic) condition at correctly perceiving and 
identifying emotions. In other words, masking causes a decreased ability to correctly 
perceive and identify emotions when compared to those who are allowed to mimic. Our 
hypothesis was supported. This finding is in agreement with previous research that 
indicates that those who mimic are better at perceiving emotions than those who do not 
mimic (Oberman, Winkielman, & Ramachandran, 2007). When analyzing differences 
between anger and other emotions, it took participants significantly longer to recognize 
anger when compared to happy and surprise, but not when compared to sad, fear, or 
disgust. This is consistent with the facial feedback hypothesis in that a participant would 
take longer recognizing emotions of anger than surprise and happiness. This is 
particularly true because participants were simulating masking with a happy expression 
in this experiment. Therefore, participants are more likely to recognize happiness faster 
than anger.  
This result is in contrast to previous findings that people are able to recognize 
angry faces faster than happy faces (Fox et al., 2000; Öhman, Lundqvist, & Esteves, 
2001). The difference between this and previous findings are that participants in this 
study were required to perceive the emotion in isolation from other present emotions. 
Other research studies have required participants to perceive emotions in the context of 
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other presented emotions or neutral stimuli (Fox et al., 2000; Öhman, Lundqvist, & 
Esteves, 2001). Plus, stimuli from some other studies have used cartoon or hand drawn 
stimuli to measure emotion perception (Fox et al., 2000; Öhman, Lundqvist, & Esteves, 
2001). The stimuli in this study were of black-and-white pictures of human faces and not 
cartoon or hand drawn stimuli. Furthermore, characteristics consistent with angry faces 
and happy faces are not as simplistic in design and vary across different people in this 
study when compared to the previous two studies. 
It was expected that when the Culture of Honor was parsed out that we would not 
see any difference in emotion perception sensitivity when compared to the control group 
(mimicking/no culture of honor prime). The reasoning behind this hypothesis was that 
within the culture of honor, masking was the mediator of decreased emotion perception 
sensitivity. Therefore, if masking was isolated out, we should not see a difference 
between the culture of honor and the control group. This hypothesis was supported. 
Therefore, we could conclude that the culture of honor does not directly affect emotion 
perception sensitivity. 
The overall hypothesis that participants who are primed with the culture of honor, 
engage in masking, which decreases emotion perception sensitivity was examined. This 
hypothesis was contingent on the results that (1) there was a significant difference 
between masking and mimicking, (2) there was not a significant difference between the 
culture of honor prime and no prime, and (3) there was an interaction effect between the 
culture of honor prime and masking, so that when masking was blocked (via mimicking) 
the culture of honor was not related to a decrease in emotion perception.  In other words, 
when masking was not blocked, the culture of honor was related to a decrease in emotion 
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perception equal to or greater than when masking was present without the culture of 
honor. Therefore, a decrease of emotion perception sensitivity is dependent on the 
mediator of masking. Condition one and two were met. However, condition three was not 
met. Therefore, according to this analysis, the hypothesis that participants who are 
primed with the culture of honor engage in masking, which decreases emotion perception 
sensitivity, was not supported. 
One reason why there may have not been an interaction between the culture of 
honor and masking may be that the stimuli to prime the culture of honor may have not 
been strong enough. For example, in other studies, participants are randomly assigned to 
be insulted or not insulted (e.g., calling the other person a name or bumping into the 
participant and calling that person a name) (Cohen, Vandello, Puente, & Rantilla, 1999; 
IJzerman, van Dijk, & Gallucci, 2007). A stronger stimuli such as those presented in 
previous studies, would be more likely to prime the culture of honor.  
The exploratory hypothesis—that high culture of honor endorsers would take 
significantly longer than low culture of honor endorsers at correctly perceiving 
emotions—was not supported. In fact, those low culture of honor endorsers took 
significantly longer than any other group. These results are consistent with other priming 
research (Beilock, Rydell, & McConnell, 2007; Briñol, Petty, & Wheeler, 2006; Lisjak, 
Molden, & Lee, 2012; Thomson, Patel, Platek, & Shackelford, 2007). Research (Beilock 
et al., 2007; Briñol et al., 2006; Lisjak et al., 2012; Thomson et al., 2007) indicates when 
primed with material that is inconsistent with our self-concept or explicit worldviews, 
people are slower performing tasks that require focused attention and response. 
Therefore, it is likely that low culture of honor endorsers took significantly longer than 
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high culture of honor endorsers because the questionnaires presented material that was 
inconsistent with low culture of honor endorsers’ self concept or worldview. These 
results shed further light on the questionnaires that were used as culture of honor primes. 
Furthermore, this may explain why there may have not been an interaction between the 
culture of honor and masking.  
Emotion was analyzed to determine if the emotion that was displayed influenced 
participants’ abilities to recognize a particular emotion. Across conditions it was found 
that emotion did affect participants’ abilities to recognize distinct emotions. In particular, 
it was found that happiness was most easily recognized and identified. Our hypothesis 
that it would take participants longer to recognize anger than any other emotion was 
partially supported. It took participants significantly longer to recognize and identify 
anger than happiness and surprise but not for sadness, fear, and disgust. The reason that 
there were no significant differences between the latter emotions and anger may be that 
sadness, fear, disgust, and anger are often attributed as negative emotions. Additionally, 
males and females are able to recognize happiness faster than any other emotion (Becker, 
Kenrick, Neuberg, Blackwell, & Smith, 2007; Hall & Matsumoto, 2004; Hampson et al., 
2006). This, though, does not necessarily answer the reason why participants were able to 
recognize surprise faster than anger. Researchers Safdar et al. (2009) point out that 
happiness and surprise generally fall under the rubric of positive emotions, while the 
other four fall under negative emotions. Additionally, these positive emotions are more 
acceptable to display (Safdar et al., 2009) and, therefore, may be more easily recognized 
and identified. 
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Gender was analyzed to determine if there were differences between groups on 
emotion perception as other research indicates (Hall & Matsumoto, 2004; Hampson, van 
Anders, & Mullin, 2006; Thayer & Johnson, 2000). This study was not able to support 
this finding. The reason why there may have not been a difference between genders was 
because Southern females may also be susceptible to effects of the culture of honor 
(Nisbett & Cohen, 1996; Vandello & Cohen, 2003; Vandello, Cohen, Grandon, & 
Franiuk, 2009). Because there appeared to be no difference in perceiving emotions across 
gender, it may strengthen the argument that there may be a Southern female culture of 
honor but may be displayed in different ways (e.g., teaching norms, verbal 
aggressiveness).  
  Race was also analyzed because some people may argue that African-Americans 
do not have a culture of honor and, therefore, would not have the same problems with 
emotion perception as Caucasians. However, research implies that African-Americans 
may have a culture of honor, which is not geographically isolated (Nisbett & Cohen, 
1996; Shackelford, 2005). Because there were no significant differences between groups, 
African-Americans were not eliminated. Also, the fact that there were no differences 
between groups may support the hypothesis that African Americans do have a culture of 
honor. 
The results of the current study do not support the hypothesis that masking is the 
mechanism that contributes to decreased ability to recognize anger in the Southern 
culture of honor. Therefore, there may be another mechanism that contributes to 
difficulties accurately recognizing angry expressions. Even though there was not support 
for masking within this culture, the overall finding was that masking did decrease 
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people’s ability to recognize emotions. This also further substantiates the facial feedback 
hypothesis, which states that in order to accurately recognize and identify an emotion in 
another person, that emotion needs to be physically embodied. Therefore, masking could 
be an additional factor that diminishes people’s abilities to empathize with another 
individual. If an individual has a difficulty empathizing with another individual it could 
also contribute to breakdown in communication. Communication breakdown could also 
lead to misunderstandings and inappropriate expressions of anger. 
Limitations and Future Directions 
 Limitations usually occur when a great amount of data has to be sacrificed due to 
software limitations and mishaps. A great limitation to this study was missing data on 
account of the software randomly crashing and failing to collect data. Due to those 
missing data points, a great deal of the data (nearly 20%) was eliminated from the 
analysis. Eliminating data due to missing data points also decreases the power of the 
study, leading to a possible type II error of falsely accepting the null hypothesis. 
 A second limitation was in the distribution of the sample. On each individual level 
of the six distinct emotions, most of the data were moderately skewed. After transforming 
the data both by square root and log transformations, we determined to use the square 
root transformation because log transformation of the data led to a violation of equality of 
covariance matrices and sphericity. Even though square root transformations led the data 
to be within normal limits, most of the six distinct emotions were slightly to moderately, 
positively skewed.  
 Due to the amount of missing data and slightly to moderately, positively skewed 
data, it could be argued that a different statistical test should have been used to examine 
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the repeated measures data. In fact, recent research (Gueorguteva & Krystal, 2004; Judd, 
Westfall, & Kenny, 2012) indicates that using repeated measures mixed-models approach 
for studies with missing data and moderately skewed data is more precise than using the 
repeated measures ANOVA. This form of data analysis is able to take into account 
correlations among repeated measures and is able to fit data better. If reanalyzing this 
data we have decided it would be better to use this approach for data analysis. 
A third limitation occurs when sources of error variance are not easily controlled 
or examined. In this study, participants were not limited to White, Caucasian/European 
American males. Instead, other races and genders were included in the study. Reasoning 
and justification has already been addressed. However, it would be beneficial to measure 
differences between groups for the endorsement of the culture of honor. Scales were used 
primarily as a prime but could have been used to determine if there were differences 
between race and gender. Depending upon endorsement, some people even within the 
South could be qualitatively different. This difference could have also contributed to the 
weakening effect of power and may have resulted in accepting the null hypothesis (i.e., 
masking being a mediator of the culture of honor and emotion perception). Although 
differences in endorsement of the culture of honor were not examined, emotion 
perception was examined across race and gender and no differences were found.  
Therefore, we could conclude that differences were not due to groups and conditions. 
Even though gender and race (42.4% identified themselves as non-white) were well 
represented age was not well represented. Other studies indicate that older adults are less 
accurate at correctly perceiving emotions than younger adults (Calder et al., 2003; Orgeta 
& Phillips, 2008). Our study primarily gathered information from a younger adult 
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population and so results may not represent well the whole population. Anecdotally, 
though, there are often reports of older men and women who engage in violence when 
insulted. Furthermore, since the culture of honor is generally more pronounce in older 
adults than in younger adults (Brown, Osterman, & Barnes, 2009), it may stand to reason 
that any effect that we would have found of the culture of honor could have generalized 
to older Southerners. 
A fourth limitation to this study was that of lacking a manipulation check to 
ensure mimicking. Other researchers have used EMGs (Bailey & Henry, 2009; Bailey et 
al., 2009; Bourgeois & Hess, 2008; Dimberg & Thunberg, 1998; Dimberg et al., 2002; 
Hess & Blairy, 2001) to ensure that participants were mimicking. This study did not use 
EMGs. Because other research showed that mimicking is an automatic response (Bailey 
& Henry, 2009; Bailey, Henry, & Nangle, 2009; Bourgeois & Hess, 2008; Dimberg & 
Thunberg, 1998; Dimberg et al., 2002; Sato & Yoshikawa, 2007; Stel & Knippenberg, 
2008) that occurs even when participants are asked to suppress (Dimberg et al., 2002; 
Kappas et al., 2000), we reasoned that it was unnecessary to have a manipulation check 
for those participants who were assigned to any mimic condition. It should be noted, 
though, absent a manipulation check there is a possibility that those who were in the 
Culture of Honor Prime group had diminished ability to mimic than those in the No 
Prime group. To be consistent throughout the study, the experimenters who ran the study 
frequently checked to ensure that all participants were paying attention to the stimuli in 
the experiment.  
A fifth limitation to this study is the translation of experimental data to real world 
situations. In order to control for many of the factors, they had to be artificially 
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manipulated. For example, in the real world, people are more likely to witness facial 
expressions that change faster than 20 seconds. Additionally, facial features are often 
moving between emotional expressions and not from a neutral facial expression to a full 
expression of emotion. Likewise, people are more likely to mask when they are put in 
situations that may cause harm. Being presented to a computer to evaluate emotions in a 
neutrally emotive experience is not likely to happen in the real world. Also, for ecological 
validity it would be important to simulate instances of insulting behavior as mentioned 
previously. 
In conclusion, it should be noted that, despite limitations, masking was found to 
affect people’s ability to accurately perceive emotions. This gives further foundation to 
masking and display rules research. To better understand masking’s effects upon emotion 
perception, it is advisable to apply it in more real world situations (e.g., low dose insults). 
With low dose insults, it is likely to create the contrast that is needed to better simulate 
masking. The fact that masking affected emotion perception further validates the facial 
feedback hypothesis that people are dependent upon facial movement to perceive 
emotions in other people. 
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APPENDIX A 
Figure 1: Masking as a Mediating Factor 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Blockage Design 
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Figure 3: Effects of Masking on Emotion Perception 
 
Figure 4: Effects of Culture of Honor on Emotion Perception 
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APPENDIX B 
Table 1 
Means and Correlations of Culture of Honor Endorsement 
 Pearson’s r Values   
            Scale COH HCQ HVS M SD 
Culture of Honor Questionnaire (COH) 1 .33* -.16 4.27 .46 
Honour Concerns Questionnaire (HCQ)  1 .42 4.27 1.23 
Honour Value Scale (HVS)   1 3.97 .72 
*p < .05 
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Table 2 
Repeated Measures Analysis of Variance 
            Effect MS df F p partial η2 
Emotional Expression 5719.43 1 4.16 .045 .05 
Culture of Honor Prime 260.15 1 .189 .66 .002 
Expression X Prime 3665.19 1 2.66 .107 .03 
Stimuli Emotion 7218.43 5 33.37 .000 .302 
Expression X Prime X Emotion 247.58 1 1.79 .34 .015 
Error 216.35 77    
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Table 3 
Mean Differences in Speed of Detection Between Emotions 
Emotion Sad Happy Surprise Fear Disgust Anger M SD 
Sad -- 4549.95* 1732.89* 902.07 792.38 478.43 16040.74 5287.46 
Happy  -- 2817.11* 5452.07* 5342.38* 5028.42* 11467.29 5470.47 
Surprise   -- 2634.96* 2525.27* 2211.31* 14286.04 5373.86 
Fear    -- -109.69 423.64 16785.66 4393.09 
Disgust     -- 313.96 16780.08 4584.63 
Anger      -- 16409.77 5322.19 
*p < .001
 
